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Value orientations of social welfarepolicy structures

Garlington S.B. Value orientations of social welfare policystructures

Substantial literature exists around the variation of welfarepolicy development in liberal democracies. The contrast of theAmerican welfare state to those in Europe has sparked sig-nificant analytical literature about which factors are most sig-nificant in the variation. The literature extensively examinesmany of these factors but has neglected the significance ofsocial values. This article discusses values and policy devel-opment as a foundation for further studies linking specificvalues to policy and institutional development. First, I discusstheorists who have identified value orientation as significantto welfare state variation; second, I review the major com-parative welfare state literature. Finally, I discuss the majorvariation categories through the lens of social values by iden-tifying the significant value orientation of sample policystructures. Comparative welfare state literature benefits fromelucidating the values orientation of welfare policies thatdefine the welfare state typological categories. Including therole of social values in welfare state comparisons promotesgreater understanding of the origins and trajectory of currentpolicy.

Key Practitioner Message: • Increase understanding ofwelfare state variation factors; • Frame questions about socialvalues reflected in social policy.

Sarah B. GarlingtonSchool of Social Work, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

Key words: welfare state, values orientation, national variation,comparative, individualism

Sarah B. Garlington, School of Social Work, Boston University,264 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215, USAE-mail: [email protected]

Accepted for publication June 24, 2013

Introduction

Welfare policy development has been dissected in mul-tiple ways emphasizing a range of factors includingeconomic changes, class struggle, and social values.The contrast of the American welfare state to those inEurope has sparked significant analytical literatureabout which factors are most significant in the variationbetween national cases. While welfare activities havefrequently been discussed in concert with churchorganizational activities, the lens of religion as a defin-ing factor has only recently been incorporated intoresearch about welfare policy development (Morgan,2002, 2006; van Kersbergen & Manow, 2009). Publiceducation as a welfare state structure has also beenbrought into the discussion (Garfinkel, Rainwater, &Smeeding, 2010). In discussing the “welfare state,” wemust understand that this concept refers to a web ofpolicies unique to each national context designed toaddress social problems. In some countries, these poli-cies that constitute the welfare state are explicitly iden-tified as such. In Scandinavian countries, for example,policies were instituted as a comprehensive effort tocreate a national welfare structure. Other countries, for

example, the USA, have extensive welfare-relatedpolicies that constitute the welfare state but are notnecessarily clearly identified as such. For example, theEarned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a policy that redis-tributes wealth, but the EITC is rarely viewed as suchby the general population or referred to in politicalrhetoric as welfare policy. In this article, I use “welfarestate” as an umbrella term for the range of policies in acountry that is used to address social problems, includ-ing the distribution of wealth. More in-depth discus-sions are needed to problematize how the literatureunderstands what policies constitute the welfare state,as Garfinkel et al. (2010) did regarding the issue ofpublic education. This will also facilitate future discus-sions of the value orientation of policy.

Welfare policy literature extensively examines manyof these factors but has neglected the significance ofsocial values. A further exploration of the contributionthe value orientation of policy structures makes towelfare policy development adds depth to the under-standing of policy variation. This article discussessocial values and welfare policy development as a foun-dation for further studies linking specific values topolicy and institutional development. First, I discuss

DOI: 10.1111/ijsw.12056Int J Soc Welfare 2014: 23: 287–295

I N T E R N AT I O N A LJ O U R N A L O F

SOCIAL WELFAREISSN 1369-6866

those theorists who have identified social values assignificant to welfare state variation; second, I reviewthe major comparative welfare state literature. Lastly, Idiscuss the major variation categories through the lensof social values by identifying the significant valueorientation of sample policy structures.

Values perspective on welfare policy development

Most welfare policy analyses recognize a multitude offactors that shape policy development. However, dif-ferent schools of thought place the emphasis on dif-ferent factors. This first section of the article focuseson literature that emphasizes the value orientation ofpolicy. As the most recognized theorist of values andpolicy, Lipset’s (1996) discussion of American ex-ceptionalism provides the foundation for discussingthe value of individualism in welfare policy in theUSA. The following discussion uses the example ofindividualism to examine the values perspective onwelfare policy development.

Classic arguments about American exceptionalismposit that the USA has a unique welfare state develop-ment because of a national emphasis on individualism(Walzer, 1990), self-sufficiency, and a limited role forgovernment (Heidenheimer, Heclo, & Adams, 1983;Hyde & Dixon, 2002; Ladd, 1994; Lipset, 1996; Weir,Orloff, & Skocpol, 1988). Lipset (1996) argued that thespecific values of the “American Creed” (liberty, egali-tarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faireeconomics) are especially significant in the USAbecause of the origins of the nation: “It [the U.S.] hasdefined its raison d’etre ideologically” (p. 18). Weiret al. (1988, p. 44) also emphasized the significance ofthe USA as “the world’s first mass democracy” in thedevelopment of welfare policy. The formation of theUSA through a revolutionary separation from a colo-nizer sets up these values to be the foundation ofnational identity, as opposed to other countries withlonger shared histories and common features. As such,Lipset argued, welfare policy in the USA developeddifferently than in other welfare states. This differ-ence results from both the emphasis on ideologyand the actual values of the “American Creed,” includ-ing individualism.

Lipset (1996) broke his discussion of values andpublic policy into three categories: state structures,Protestantism, and economic dynamics. The followingdiscussion uses these categories to better understandthe values perspective on welfare policy development.

State structures

In the USA, many parts of society reflect the valueof individualism. In discussing welfare policy, theconstitutional provisions in the USA that express

individualism are the most relevant. These provisionsinclude the division of federal powers and the structureof election cycles. First, the weak centralization offederal power purposely limits the government’s abilityto regulate the lives of individuals, which is in contrastto the parliamentary structure found in other liberaldemocracies (Axtmann, 2004; Evans, Rueschemeyer,& Skocpol, 1985; Huber, Ragin, & Stephens, 1993;Huber & Stephens, 2001; Immergut, 1992): “Thechronic antagonism to the state derived from theAmerican Revolution has been institutionalized in theunique division of powers . . . a deliberate decision bythe country’s founders to create a weak and internallyconflicted political system” (Lipset, 1996, p. 39). Nettl(1968) argued that this state structure in the USAmakes law the utmost tool for social change: “Theweakness of the state, the emphasis on individual rightsand a constitutionally mandated division of powers . . .[means that] only law is sovereign” (as cited in Lipset,1996, p. 40). The primacy of law and the division ofpowers are both expressions of individualism and rein-forcement of it as a value as only certain rights (civil,political vs. social, andeconomic) are incorporated intothe state structure and consequent policy (Glendon,1992; Marshall, 1987).

The structure of elections, both local and national,also emphasizes individual rights. Elected officials fillmore offices in the USA than in other liberal democra-cies, and the USA also holds elections more frequently.This allows individuals to hold representatives directlyaccountable for policy decisions. The value is placed onthe right of the individual over other values such asefficiency of government or trust in government deci-sion making (Lipset, 1996). The individualistic struc-ture of elections reinforces each citizen’s access to thedemocratic process – for better or worse. This rein-forcement becomes iterative as elected officials mustrespond immediately to voter influence because ofshort election cycles and so are less able to createlong-term policy change that might undermine thecurrent social values – individualism, for example(Huber & Stephens, 2001; Immergut, 1992).

Protestantism

Religion can influence welfare policy in several ways.One way is through the relationship between religionand society; a second way is through the content of reli-gion. For example, the specific brand of Protestantismin the USA has contributed directly to the emphasison individualism (Lipset, 1996; Parsons, 1964; Weber,1946). From the beginning, Protestant church forma-tion has been unique in the USA (Ammerman, 2005;Warner, 1993, 2005). Churches in the USA are volun-tary, sect based, and nonhierarchical, in contrast toProtestant churches in Europe that are more

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“birthright” oriented and hierarchical (Lipset, 1996;Morgan, 2006; van Kersbergen & Manow, 2009). Thiscongregational element of religion in the USA pro-motes egalitarianism and individualism as primaryvalues in both political and religious life by investingthe individual with moral responsibility (Bellah,Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985).

Lipset (1996) addressed the contribution of Protes-tant sectarianism to individualistic US welfare policystructures specifically: “American Protestant sectarian-ism has both reinforced and been strengthened bysocial and political individualism. The sectarian isexpected to follow a moral code, as determined byhis/her own sense of rectitude . . .” (p. 19). The particu-lar congregational structure of religion in the USA rep-resents individualism because it is antihierarchical andantielitist. Beyond Protestantism, this congregationalstructure influences the ways that other religious tradi-tions are structured in the USA as well – orientedaround values such as individualism (Warner, 1993).Social welfare policy in the USA then reflects thisinvestment in individual moral responsibility in wayssuch as temporary, crisis-oriented assistance and ser-vices geared toward the “deserving poor” (Schneider &Ingram, 1993).

The unique constitutional structure of the church–state relationship also represents the individualisticvalue orientation of American Protestantism (Manow,2004; Morgan, 2006; van Kersbergen & Manow, 2009).Protecting the state and the churches from undue influ-ence on each other reinforces the founding ideologyof the USA by protecting individuals’ freedom andautonomy. Ladd (1994) argued that Americans see reli-gion’s contribution to democracy as positive:

Outside the U.S., the historic association of churcheswith non-democratic forces, especially the aristo-cracy, meant that proponents of a newer, freer, moreegalitarian and democratic order often had goodreason to consider religious institutions . . . to be theirenemies. The U.S., however, has historically seenreligious experience contributing to the strength andvitality of democracy. (p. 15)

The separation of church and state in the USAenables this positive contribution because the separa-tion reinforces individualistic values by prioritizingindividual freedom (both from the state and from thechurch) at the institutional level.

Although he did not speak specifically to the valueof individualism, Casanova (2009) did tie less compre-hensive welfare policy in the USA to the specific con-figuration of religious denominations: “Americanshave defeated so far every attempt to institutionalizethe welfare state because of the model of a self-organized and privately regulated civil society which isso intrinsically related with their model of religion

denominationalism” (p. 1). This denominationalism isthe congregational structure that directly contributesto the individualism in US policy – the nonhierarchi-cal, voluntary organizational structure and the separa-tion of church and state authority. Parsons (1964)also emphasized the influence of Protestantism onAmerican values, such as individualism and pluralism,through the orientation of Protestantism toward indi-vidual religious engagement. An evolutionary theoryof the incorporation of Protestant values into secularsociety and social policy is problematic if it assumesthat Protestantism is the root from which all elsegrows. Protestantism is a contributing factor in the his-torical development of social values (specifically indi-vidualism) in the context of the USA but not to theexclusion of other factors.

Economic dynamics

In the USA, the value on individualism is also repre-sented in economic relationships that shape welfarepolicy development (Weber, 1946). Lipset (1996) wrotethat the Protestant sectarian history of the USA pro-moted hard work and economic ambition in individualsas moral behavior. As morally oriented, an individual’sability to work hard and resist laziness directly leads toeconomic success. This individualistic explanation foreconomic success shaped the USA’s relationship withindustrialization as well as the trajectory of workers’organizations – both contributions to the development ofwelfare policy (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Weber, 1946).

As discussed above, American individualismfoments resistance to government intervention in manysectors of society, especially the economy. This laissez-faire orientation reflects the value on individualism inthe assumption that industrialization brought increasedeconomic opportunities for individuals. Governmentintervention was thought to only hinder the egalitariannature of economic opportunity for success and classmobility (Ladd, 1994). The emphasis on the free marketand the equality of opportunity placed primary valueon the individual as the engine for all activity. In this,Ladd wrote: “Americans declare themselves preparedto countenance very substantial economic inequalities,while insisting on the importance of the ideal of equalopportunity” (1994, p. 35).

In their analysis of market-based social securitypolicy, Hyde and Dixon (2002) used the language of“welfare ideology” to discuss how values along anindividualism–collectivism spectrum link to policy thatis more or less reliant on the free market to addresssocial issues. By using values to understand the rolethat the market plays in policy reform, Hyde and Dixondescribed how an emphasis on individualism (or col-lectivism) manifests specific policy solutions to socialwelfare issues (social security in this case). US policy

Welfare policy development and social values

falls on the individualist end of the spectrum because ofits emphasis on market-based means to address socialsecurity reforms.

Historically, the USA also exhibits individualism asa social value in its lack of strong unions and otherworkers’ organizations (Lipset, 1996). The nationalhistory of revolution against hierarchical, statist struc-tures and values discourages workers’ organizations.Americans see these organizations as compromisingthe individual’s right to self-determination (Forbath,1991; Ladd, 1994; Lipset, 1996). Lipset (1996) made astrong argument for the uniqueness of the egalitarianclass structure in the USA and the value on individual-ism that this reflects: “Where workers are led by thesocial structure to think in fixed class terms, as they arein postfeudal societies, they have been more likely tosupport socialist or labor parties or join unions” (p. 23).In other liberal democracies, these workers’ organiza-tions have driven the development of social insuranceprograms, programs significantly different in nature tothose in the USA (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The historyof organizing workers in the USA is complex andclearly not shaped by a single factor.

The individualistic value orientation of various USsocial structures (political, religious, and economic)demonstrates the significance of values in understand-ing policy development. Theoretical discussions ofwelfare policy often mention values, but only a fewauthors dissect and emphasize the role of values assignificant. This section has presented the arguments ofthose value-oriented theories. The following sectionpresents major nonvalues-focused arguments forwelfare policy development variation.

Major nonvalues-oriented theories on welfarepolicy development

This section reviews three of the most significant theo-retical categories regarding welfare policy developmentvariation that are oriented around nonvalues factors.Using the categorical language of Huber and Stephens(2001), the three theoretical approaches reviewed are the“logic of industrialism,” “state-centered,” and “politicalclass struggle” (p. 14). These three categories provide aframework for understanding how theorists emphasizethe role of economic, social, and political factors inwelfare policy development. Other theoretical discus-sions regarding cross-national differences in welfarepolicy development exist as well, but the scope of thisarticle addresses only the major categorical schema.

Logic of industrialism

The logic of the industrialism framework for under-standing cross-national welfare policy developmentvariation focuses on the economic transition to a more

industrialized society. Several theorists have arguedthat welfare policy has been a direct consequence ofindustrialization (Ebbinghaus & Manow, 2001; Hall& Soskice, 2001; Polanyi, 2002; Wilensky, 1975). Theshape welfare policy takes is determined by the structureand experience of economic changes within a nation-state, “by-products of economic development and itsdemographic and social organizational consequences”(Huber & Stephens, 2001, p. 15). Most theorists haverecognized industrialization as a key feature of welfarestate development, but some emphasize this as the primefactor (Pampel & Williamson, 1989; Wilensky, 1975).

Welfare policy origins link directly to the timelineof industrialization in Western liberal democracies. Inthe 18th and 19th centuries, the USA and Europeexperienced significant changes in the economic andsocial landscapes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber &Stephens, 2001). Increased mechanization of industryled to the accumulation of wealth by the owners. Thesuccess of this system of industry relied on increasedamounts of workers as well as stability in the rule of lawto guarantee contractual obligations. With industriali-zation came migration from rural areas to urban areasand increasingly institutionalized government struc-tures in nation-state form (Axtmann, 2004). Commu-nity and family structures changed as well because ofmobility and employment market changes (Morgan,2006). As individuals and families migrated from ruralareas to larger cities for employment opportunities, thesupport of extended family networks was disrupted.With this came an increasing need to address the nega-tive consequences of industrialization-focused migra-tion such as social dislocation and income disparity(Piven & Cloward, 1993).

Discussion of welfare state variation often focuseson how industrialization happened differently in differ-ent countries. The combination of increased economicresources (the accumulation of wealth by some) and theincreased social dislocation was managed by nation-states in a variety of ways. Some proponents of the“logic of industrialism” theory link the birth of thewelfare state directly to economic growth (Cameron,1978; Wilensky, 1975). While empirically this parallelgrowth can be disputed (Skocpol, 1991), the welfarepolicies that states developed (and continue to develop)are a key part of how they managed this economicgrowth. Tax structures for wealth redistribution, theservices provided by the tax funds, and the populationswho benefit from the services vary from country tocountry. In the USA, for example, the early 1900s sawthe development of policy targeting the aging popula-tion: “performing something of a regulatory functionby instituting programs to provide for those necessarily(and appropriately) forced from the productiveeconomy” (Hudson, 2008, p. 533). In contrast, welfarepolicy in countries such as The Netherlands originated

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with family-oriented policies intended to protect familystructures from economic changes (Morgan, 2006).Other theorists have discussed additional elements ofeconomic change during industrialization that shapedwelfare policy. Ebbinghaus and Manow (2001) wrotethat intersections between social welfare policy andpolitical economy (industrial relations, the productionsystem and employment regime, and the financial andcorporate finance system) help explicate how statesaddressed these needs in varying ways. Orloff (1993)discussed the expansion of welfare policy in countries,such as Sweden, in which policy is shaped by womenentering the workforce. Economic growth due to indus-trialization put nation-states in a position to addressthe rising social welfare needs (Huber et al., 1993;Wilensky, 1975). However, other factors within coun-tries also contributed to how social welfare needs wereunderstood and how these economic resources wereused to address the needs.

State centered

State-centered explanations for welfare policy variationamong countries look at factors beyond economicchanges and stability. State structures and past policyshape how current and future policy decisions are maderegarding social welfare needs (Evans et al., 1985;Heclo, 1976; Hicks & Swank, 1992; Lowi, 1964).Examining these factors beyond the economic contextbegins to incorporate other political and social ele-ments that shape policy as well.

Skocpol (1985) emphasized the influence of“autonomous state action” on political culture andsocial policy, as well as on the centralization (or lack) ofstate power. Features such as federalism and govern-ment autonomy (Huber et al., 1993; Immergut, 1992)influence the way the state can create and implementwelfare policy, as well as how the need for policy isdetermined. Robertson’s (1993) discussion of the “newinstitutionalism” emphasized two intersecting ele-ments: political capacity and political coherence. Byoutlining what he called “limiting conditions” forpublic policy creation by the state, Robertson explainedhow characteristics of the state structure shape policy.He defined political capacity in this way: “first, theformal boundaries of legitimate government interven-tion . . . ; second, government’s fiscal ability . . . ; andthird, the professionalism and expertise of legislatorsand public administrators” (Robertson, 1993, p. 24).

Also, Hudson (2008) pointed out the unique structurebetween the civil service and the government in the USAin which the lack of autonomy interferes with the abilityto create an administrative bureaucracy (Orloff &Skocpol, 1984; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). In his com-parative analysis of Sweden and the UK, Heclo (1976)identified this bureaucracy and the administrators in it as

a significant variable because of the decision-makingposition: “Policy-making is a form of collective puzzle-ment on society’s behalf; it entails both deciding andknowing” (p. 304).

Robertson’s (1993) political coherence is then justthat: how centralized the state is and how autonomousare its various parts. For example, the structure of theUS federal government with its checks and balancesrequires continual compromise and incorporation ofvarying interests regarding policy decision making.Similarly, Huber and Stephens (2001) argued that statestructure is a political variable as defined by “the con-centration or dispersion of political power resulting fromconstitutional provisions” (p. 4) or veto points (seealso Immergut, 1992). The USA has more veto pointsthan countries that, like Sweden, have more expansivewelfare states. Huber and Stephens (2001) argued thatthese points at which policy can be thwarted in thedecision-making process slow the development of acomprehensive policy. These theories highlight the sig-nificance of structure in government’s ability to appro-priate an issue as a public policy one, as well as its abilityto address that issue. The differences in state autonomy,capacity, coherence, and dispersion of power all contrib-ute to the variation in welfare policy cross-nationally.

A recent development in this area of welfare policytheory is the emphasis on the structural relationshipbetween church and state (Manow, 2004; Morgan,2006; van Kersbergen & Manow, 2009). While incor-porating some of the elements discussed above, thistheoretical piece focuses on the transition of socialwelfare provision to the state from the church as asignificant structural factor in policy development. Thistransition depends strongly on the unique powerdynamic between church and state in a national context.In discussing the origins of family policy specific tomothers, Morgan (2006) wrote: “Patterns of church–state relations and religious conflict had an enduringimpact on early family and educational policies, as wellas the way religion would be incorporated into politics”(p. 3). The variation in ways that nation-states devel-oped in relation to the established church shaped thebalance of who provides welfare services. RegardingSweden, Morgan (2006) wrote: “This pattern ofchurch–state fusion, weak religious cleavage, andadvanced secularization facilitated the expansion ofstate responsibility for children and families” (p. 46).The USA, in contrast, has a unique separation of churchand state that has shaped the “decentralization ofmatters of family morality and children’s education tostates, local communities, and the voluntary sector”(Morgan, 2006, p. 53).

The work of van Kersbergen and Manow (2009)took the theoretical explanations of welfare state vari-ation a further step back to examine a state’s ability toassume responsibility for social welfare:

Welfare policy development and social values

This cleavage [of church and state] has been the resultof state–church conflicts in the wake of the nationalrevolution when state-building elites challenged theposition of the church in domains perceived crucialfor the creation of modern nation-states, particularlyeducation but also social protection. (p. 10)

Using the USA as an example, the unique constitu-tional structure of church and state stems from thereligious diversity of the population and has contrib-uted to the exponential growth of pluralism (Morgan,2002, 2006). This constitutional structure and the reli-gious diversity slowed the state’s assumption of socialwelfare provision in the USA. In contrast, the religioushomogeneity in Sweden, for example, meant that theprimary religious organizations could be subsumedunder the national government structure, and the gov-ernment could easily assume responsibility for socialwelfare provision that had previously been the purviewof the church (Morgan, 2006; van Kersbergen &Manow, 2009).

The effects of past policy, or path dependency,demonstrate another entry point for policy’s influenceon state structures (Heclo, 1976; Huber et al., 1993).Welfare policy arguably creates certain constituencies(whether beneficiaries, proponents, or adversaries) whocontribute to shaping state and policy structures in newand consequential ways: “As each policy is put into placeit transforms the distribution of preferences; as theregime increasingly entrenches itself, it transforms theuniverse of actors” (Huber & Stephens, 2001, p. 32). Theparticipation of citizens and the form that participationtakes (whether interest group based, identity based, etc.)is impacted by welfare policy specifically, as Mettler(2007) argued, but also then reflects back on to shapingfuture policy. Schneider and Ingram (1993) wrote aboutthe ways in which policy either motivates individuals toparticipate in the political process or actually distancesthem from the political system. For example, Mettler(2007) discussed how the Servicemen’s ReadjustmentAct of 1944 (popularly known as the GI Bill) in the USAcreated a constituency of politically engaged citizensbecause beneficiaries saw the government as working intheir favor. Hudson (2008) and Campbell (2011) alsodiscussed this phenomenon regarding older adults andSocial Security’s inception and continual strength:

Thus, at ‘time 1,’ public policy may have been criti-cal in the creation and institutionalization of theorganized aging, but at ‘time 2,’ the groups becomecritical in efforts to expand – or more recently – todefend the policies against outside encroachment,(Hudson, 2008, pp. 548–549)

Esping-Andersen (1990) wrote: “The welfare state isnot just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possiblycorrects, the structure of inequality; it is, in its own

right, a system of stratification. It is an active force inthe ordering of social relations” (p. 23).

Two constitutive elements of the nation-state con-tribute to the development of the welfare state and itsvariation among countries: state structure and statepolicy. State structure and policy also add to the dis-cussion of how industrialization and economic changesfacilitate welfare policy and cross-national variation.While some theorists emphasize one set of factors overthe other, all of the arguments discussed thus farprovide insight into the cross-national variation.

Political class struggle

In cross-national comparisons of welfare states, left-wing politics, and the mobilization of workers play asignificant differentiating role. This explanatory factorfits well with the major variation between the USA andother liberal Western democracies. The USA lacks bothan expansive welfare state and a history of left-wing/working-class political organizing (Kimeldorf &Stepan-Norris, 1992). Esping-Andersen (1990) wrote:“the history of political class coalitions is the mostdecisive cause of welfare-state variation” (p.1). Hisarguments and other theories in this category of politicalclass struggle were much more sophisticated, however,than a simple link between labor power and welfarepolicy. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) major project was tocategorize welfare state variation into a comprehensivetypology based on how a country “de-commodifies”labor or removes an individual’s dependence on themarket for survival. The explanatory factors that heemphasized in his analysis of the variation amongtypologies include class-political coalition structures,the history of welfare policy institutionalization, and,most of all, class mobilization. Esping-Andersen arguedthat the political power of workers’ organizations stem-ming from class mobilization enabled these organiza-tions to have more power in political coalitions and morevoice in policy development.

Similarly, Huber and Stephens (2001) discussedpower resources theory as an explanation for welfarepolicy variation: “The struggle over welfare states is astruggle over distribution, and thus the organizationalpower of those standing to benefit from redistribution,the working and lower middle classes, is crucial” (p.17). Again, looking back at the process of industriali-zation and the associated economic and social changes,significant variation exists among countries regardingthe mobilization of new stratifications of workers. Thisrefers to labor union organizing, working-class/leftistpolitical party activity, and the “decommodification oflabor” (Ebbinghaus & Manow, 2001; Esping-Andersen,1990; Korpi, 1983): “We can understand 19th centurydevelopments in social legislation in terms of the crea-tion of a self-regulating market, the social dislocation

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this caused, and the counteraction in the form of socialprotection this provoked” (van Kersbergen & Manow,2009, p. 9). With working-class mobilization, politicalpower could be accessed by those who would benefitfrom social welfare legislation and who challenged reli-ance on the free market. Again, the USA stands out asa country with limited working-class mobilization aswell as a less comprehensive welfare policy comparedwith that of countries like Sweden and Germany(Esping-Andersen, 1990).

This “distribution of organizational power” betweenlabor/left and center/right can be examined over time aswell as in different national contexts to explain theoccurrence of specific welfare policies and the expan-siveness of a country’s welfare state (Hicks & Swank,1992; Korpi, 1983). Huber and Stephens (2001) found“consistent and strong effects of political incumbencyof social democratic and Christian democratic parties”regarding the expansiveness of the welfare state (p. 39).While the authors include a range of variables, includ-ing the international economy, the logic of industrial-ism, and women’s labor force participation, the studyaffirms the main hypothesis that social democraticparty power directly leads to progressive welfare policy.Esping-Andersen’s (1990) contribution was the linkbetween working-class mobilization and this socialdemocratic political power.

This section has outlined major nonvalues-orientedtheories regarding welfare policy development andcross-national variation. Most explanatory discussionsof welfare policy include some combination of theabove, as well as other elements that do not fall intothese major categorizations. Additional theoretical per-spectives include Marxist and feminist critiques thathighlight the intersection of the core factors discussed,such as class struggle and economic changes (Morgan,2006; Piven & Cloward, 1993). An explication of thevalues orientation of the policy structures that thesetheoretical discussions analyze is missing.

Discussion

Thus far, this article has discussed many factorsexplaining variation in welfare policy development

among countries. Theorists emphasize different causalfactors, from industrialization to political structures(Table 1). The first section discussed the value of indi-vidualism specifically and how individualism is repre-sented through welfare policy development in the USA.The second section then moved to other arguments thatdo not include the significance of values in understand-ing the differences in welfare policy development andwelfare state typologies. This final section returns tothe role of shared social values in policy developmentand discusses how categorical theories are incompletewithout discussing the role of social values in welfarepolicy development. Values contribute to the devel-opment of welfare state policy through the valueorientation of past policies and current policy-making structures.

Logic of industrialization

As discussed earlier, one type of argument regardingwelfare policy development variation is the logic ofindustrialization framework. This group of theoriesfocuses on how a country historically made the eco-nomic transition to a more industrial society and howthat country addressed the social consequences of theseeconomic changes. Lipset (1996) argued that the statestructures in the USA that managed this transitiondirectly represented social values specific to the USA.Van Kersbergen and Manow (2009) and Morgan (2006)argued that the structure of the church–state relation-ship also shaped how countries addressed industrializa-tion’s social consequences. In the USA, the uniquechurch–state relationship is a direct representation ofvalues such as individualism (Lipset, 1996; Morgan,2006; van Kersbergen & Manow, 2009). The USA alsorelied on market forces more than on government inter-vention to manage the social changes stemming fromindustrialization (Hyde & Dixon, 2002). This prefer-ence for market forces over government interventionalso reflects social values. Incorporating a values per-spective in understanding economic and social changesin the relevant time period of industrialization andwelfare policy development adds an important dimen-sion of analysis.

Table 1. Theories of welfare state development.

Industrialization State centered Political class struggle Values

History, mechanization ofindustry, workforce

Autonomous state action Mobilization of workers Trust re: governmentintervention

Economics/taxation State structure, centralization of power,political capacity, political coherence,veto points

Left-wing politics, political class coalitions,class mobilization, power resourcestheory

Individual- communityorientation

Family structure, socialdislocation

Church/state structure Decommodify labor Degree of economic marketregulation

Urban migration Path dependency, past policyPolitical economy Construction of target populations

Welfare policy development and social values

State centered

When discussing state-centered theories, the emphasisis on the structure within which policy decisions aremade. Robertson (1993) argued that a federal govern-ment’s coherence and capacity determine the ease ofpolicy creation and implementation. The creation ofstructures that reflect coherence and capacity is influ-enced by the shared social values in the nationalcontext. For example, the relative lack of coherence ofthe US federal government structure, Lipset (1996)argued, reflects a value on individual freedom fromgovernment intervention over more communitariansocial values. In the USA, the intentional decentraliza-tion and checks/balances structure of the federal gov-ernment is based on a lack of trust in government andan emphasis on protecting the individual from govern-ment rather than utilizing government and policy toprovide for individuals. The political consequences ofpast policy are also discussed by state-centered theo-rists (Heclo, 1976). By incorporating the discussionof social values into the creation of deserving andundeserving target populations (Schneider & Ingram,1993) or citizen participation (Campbell, 2011;Mettler, 2007), the discussion of welfare policy devel-opment becomes more nuanced.

Political class struggle

The emphasis on political class coalitions even moreclearly reflects shared social values. Theorists havediscussed the uniqueness of the USA and its lackof cohesive workers’ organizations (Esping-Andersen,1990; Lipset, 1996). Huber and Stephens (2001) spe-cifically talked about the nature of welfare policybeing inherently about the distribution of resourcesand that this distribution is directly impacted by howorganized the beneficiaries are. The lack of workers’organizations and working-class political power in theUSA, Lipset (1996) and Ladd (1994) argued, aredue to an emphasis on self-determination, as oneexample. Understanding why political class organizinghappens the way it does uniquely in each countryrequires analysis of social structures and valuesreflected in those structures. Power resources theoryand decommodification both reflect social values inthe national context of reliance on the free market toredistribute resources.

While the typology of theories (logic of industriali-zation, state-centered, and political class struggle) isuseful for assessing differences in emphasis, the discus-sion of values reinforces the view that the three typesintersect significantly. For example, many of the theo-ries reflect on the role of state structures even whendiscussing industrialization and political class struggle,among other factors. Highlighting social values makes

these intersections more clear and useful by integratinga backdrop of social context.

Conclusion

Connecting social values to policy development pro-vides insight into both the nuances of values and thecomplexities of policy variation. Van Kersbergen andManow (2009) wrote that “welfare state developmentwas related to the problem of social disorder anddisintegration that was created by the increasingstructural–functional differentiation of modern socie-ties” (p. 6). A historical analysis of welfare policydevelopment and the value orientation of the contextualstructures and past policies contribute to the under-standing of how factors such as economic changes,political class struggle, or historical events resonate inspecific national contexts of social order. Including therole of social values in welfare policy developmentcomparisons strengthens the analysis and helps us tounderstand the origins and trajectory of current policy.

This article establishes the significance of socialvalues as a core factor that constitutes welfare policy asa social structure. As nation-states outside of the tradi-tional Western democracy models develop compre-hensive welfare policies, incorporating social valuesinto policy analysis facilitates nuanced and criticalunderstandings of how nations shape redistributionpolicy in response to economic, state, and political/social changes.

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